marcin pisze:Ogladalem kiedys taki serial przedstawiajacy rozne katastrofy lotnicze i najwieksze wrazenie zrobilo na mnie jak gosc lecac B-767 nad atlantykiem z powodu swojego bledu wylal prawie cale paliwo, a nastepnie przelecial ponad 200 km jak szybowiec .... by wyladowac na Azorach na pasie przeznaczonym dla malych samolocikow
nie majac oczywiscie hamowania silnikiem, a pas konczyl sie kilfem ...
To byl A330 (Airbus) a nie B767 <mrgreen>
A tutaj dane:
"Air Transat Flight TS236, was en route at FL390 when at 05:36 UTC, the crew became aware of a fuel imbalance between the left and right-wing main fuel tanks. Five minutes later the crew concerned about the lower-that-expected fuel quantity indication, decided to divert to Lajes Airport in the Azores. At 05:48 UTC, when the crew ascertained that a fuel leak could be the reason for the possible fuel loss, an emergency was declared to Santa Maria Oceanic Control. At 06:13, at a calculated distance of 135 miles from Lajes, the right engine (Rolls-Royce Trent 772B) flamed out. At 06:26, when the aircraft was about 85 nm from Lajes and at an altitude of about FL345, the left engine flamed out. At 06:39 the aircraft was at 13,000 feet and 8 miles from the threshold of runway 33. An engines-out visual approach was carried out and the aircraft landed on runway 33. Eight of the plane's ten tyres burst during the landing.
Investigation has determined that a low-pressure fuel line on the right engine, had failed probably as the result of its coming into contact with an adjacent hydraulic line."
Slynna sprawa! Zgadza sie! A ten przypadek kiedy DHL rozplatal ogonem czarter z rosyjskimi dziecmi lecacymi do Hiszpanii, a stalo sie to tylko dlatego, ze w Szwajcarii w jakiejs ACT mieli kompletny balagan i nie potrafili sobie poradzic z trzema samolotami w ich obszarze powietrznym! Dramat normalnie!
Nie balagan, ale w nocy sie odbywa "serwis" sprzetu. No i tak serwisowali, ze wylaczyli jeden radar a i osoba ktora go oslugiwala miala "za duzo" na glowie bo ktos tam sobie na kawe poszedl - serio <lol>
A tutaj pelne dane:
Bashkirian Airlines flight 2937 (a Tupolev 154) originated in Ufa, Russia and flew to Moscow to pick up passengers. From Moscow the aircraft continued as a charter flight to Barcelona. The flight used the RNAV-Route Salzburg - Traunstein - Kempten - Trasadingen at Flight Level 360. Communications were handed over from Munich to Zürich ACC at 23:30:11. At that moment one controller was responsible for the entire traffic in the Zürich airspace. He was monitoring two frequencies and two radar scopes. On one frequency (119,925 MHz) he was guiding one traffic for an approach into Friedrichshafen and on the other frequency (128,050 MHz) he had to control four aircraft. Between 23:25:43 and 23:33:11 LT the controller tried serveral times to establish contact with Friedrichshafen by phone. Because of working on the telephone net of Skyguide, the controller was not able to reach Friedrichshafen.
At 23:34:42, 50 seconds prior collision, the Tupolev's Honeywell 2000 TCAS gave a Traffic Advisory and seven seconds later the radar controller issued the first descent instructions to flight 2937 to FL350: "descend flight level 350, expedite, I have crossing traffic". This descent was necessary for continuation of the flight to Barcelona and to achieve a vertical separation with respect to an approaching DHL Boeing 757 cargo plane.
This flight was en route from Bergamo, Italy to Brussels along RNAV-Route ABESI-AKABI-TANGO at FL360.
At 23:42:56 the crews of both aircraft received a Resolution Advisory-command from their TCAS. The DHL crew complied with this and initiate a descent, when the Tupolev crew were then trying to deal with the conflicting descent (by ATC) and climb (TCAS) instructions. Seven seconds after the Resolution Advisory-command, the ATC controller repeated the instruction to descend. The Bashkirian crew then decided to follow the ATC controller's instructions. A little later the Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) aboard the Boeing 757 gave the crew a Resolution Advisory (RA) to "increase descent". They then contacted ATC, telling the controller that they were doing a TCAS descent.
Since both aircraft were descending, the TCAS of the Russian plane warned the crew to "increase climb" to avoid a collision. This was eight seconds before the collision. Just prior to the collision, both crews detected the other aircraft, and reacted to avoid the collision by attempting appropriate flight manoeuvres. Nevertheless, at 23:35:32 both aircraft collided at approx. FL354. The tail fin of the Boeing 757 struck the left side of the Tupolev 154 fuselage near both overwing emergency exits, while the Tupolev's left wing sheared off 80% of the Boeing's tail fin. The Tupolev immediately broke up in four pieces (left wing, right wing, main fuselage and tail unit including the engines). The Boeing 757 lost control and crashed 8km North of the Tupolev, just after losing both engines.
That night, from 23:00 the configuration of the radar data processing of Skyguide was modified. Thus the system was operating in FALLBACK modus. This requires among other facts, that radar separation values were increased from 5 NM to 7 NM. Also, the STCA (Short Term Conflict Alert) was not available at that time. The STCA at Karlsruhe Upper Area Control Center (UAC) however did work. From 23:33:36 on the controller of Karlsruhe UAC, tried in vain to get in contact with Zürich-ATC until 23:35:34. Between 23:33:36 and 23:34:45 the busy signal was to be heared afterwards the ringing tone. According to his statements the controller tried repeatedly to establish the connection via the priority button, but it failed.
CAUSES: The following immediate causes have been identified:
- The imminent separation infringement was not noticed by ATC in time. The instruction for the TU154M to descend was given at a time when the prescribed separation to the B757-200 could not be ensured anymore.
- The TU154M crew followed the ATC instruction to descend and continued to do so even after TCAS advised them to climb. This manoeuvre was performed contrary to the generated TCAS RA.
The following systemic causes have been identified:
- The integration of ACAS/TCAS II into the system aviation was insufficient and did not correspond in all points with the system philosophy.
The regulations concerning ACAS/TCAS published by ICAO and as a result the regulations of national aviation authorities, operational and procedural instructions of the TCAS manufacturer and the operators were not standardised, incomplete and partially contradictory.
- Management and quality assurance of the air navigation service company did not ensure that during the night all open workstations were continuously staffed by controllers.
- Management and quality assurance of the air navigation service company tolerated for years that during times of low traffic flow at night only one controller worked and the other one retired to rest.
